5,000 dollars (I think such was his statement) in the hands of a gentleman in Philadelphia or New York; that he had a suit against Mr. Woodbridge's father in Marietta, for some 5 or 10,000 dollars, I do not remember which. He valued his property on the island at 50,000 dollars. I do not recollect of any other particular communication from Mr. Blannerhassett.

Mr. Hay. With what view did you understand this detail of his property was made? A. Shall I tell you my impressions? I have omitted one particular expression of his as relating to the English funds: "that they could not get at them." *Mr. Wirt.* Did he say who they were? A. He did not; but I supposed, the government of the U. S. in case of hostilities. Mr. *M'Rae.* Did you understand with what view it was he spoke of his property? Mr. *Martin* objected to any such interrogatories about the impressions or inferences of a witness. If the publication of this trial goes to Europe, what a contemptible opinion will it afford of our judiciary proceedings? *Chief Justice.* Was there any thing else, besides what you have stated, from which you made this inference? A. Nothing else. *Mr. McRae.* Was there any thing calculated to make a particular impression on your mind? A. My impression from his statement was, that he intended to shew, if he risked so much property, that we might surely risk the little that we had. *Mr. Wirt.* Will you state the answer you made to this application? A. We did not positively tell Mr. Blannerhassett, that we would not join in the enterprise; but that we must take time to consider it; that we had relations on this side of the mountains, whom we must consult. *Mr. Wirt.* Did Mr. Blannerhassett mention the effect, this revolution would have on Wood county? A. He said that it could not long remain neutral; and that we must take an active part for or against. *Mr. Blannerhassett.* Do you mean Wood county? A. I mean that part of the country.

Mr. Wirt. Could you understand, why your brother enquired whether John Randolph was not concerned? A. Because Mr. Blannerhasset had mentioned that the leading characters in the union were concerned, and we considered J. Randolph as a man of great character, and a very leading man.

Mr. Wirt. Did you understand whether he said any thing of Mr. Jefferson? A. Mr. Blannerhasset said, if Mr. J. was any way impertinent, that colonel Burr would tie him neck and heels, and throw him into the Potomac. Q. What did he say of his means of opposition to the government? A. He mentioned that with 3 pieces of artillery and 300 sharp shooters, he could defend any pass in the Alleghany Mountains that he had seen, against any force the government could send against him.

Mr. Wirt. Did he show you any composition he was about to publish? A. He showed me the first and second No. of the Querist which he intended to publish: at all events he showed me one, which he read to me and then gave it to me to read the over-night. I kept it all night and returned it next morning.

Mr. Hay. Did he say that he had written those pieces? A. So I understood.

Mr. Wirt. Did he say that he was going to publish them? A. He said, that he was going to Marietta next day to attend to the publication; for that the printer was a timid man and required to be backed. Q. What did you inform him about your own intentions? A. We informed him that we knew not whether we could or could not join in the scheme. We however told Mr. Blannerhasset that he must not consider us as in any way committed.

Mr. Wirt. Do you recollect, he told you, what particular circumstances would prevent your long remaining neutral? Was it any commercial arrangement? A. I think, he said, that being in possession of the New Orleans country and the mouth of the river, we could not long remain neutral. Q. Do you carry your produce to market through that channel. A. We do not.

Mr. Hay. He said that Mr. Graham was engaged: had you seen Mr. Graham on the subject? A. I had not seen Mr. Graham for 8 or 10 years before: but I saw him a short time after this interview. On the 20th of November, I received a letter from Mr. Graham, earnestly requesting an interview with me at the mouth of Little Kanawha. I met him there on the 22d. I must confess, that I had every inclination to disclose this secret to him, when I first met him, but I did not conceive myself justifiable, because I had promised to keep this communication secret. Considering however that Mr. Blannerhasset had positively assured me that Mr. Graham was positively concerned in it, I asked him first, if he was concerned in any scheme with colonel Burr down the river. He said that he was not, and moreover that he was authorised to prevent and arrest any such illegal proceedings. I did then conceive myself justified in communicating to him the substance of the scheme. Before this time, about the 1st of Oct. we had determined to oppose the scheme; and went down to the mouth of Kanawha to inform Mr. Blannerhasset of our intentions, but he was gone down to Kentucky perhaps with Mr. and Mrs. Alston; and we then sent a message to that effect to Mrs. Blannerhasset that they might not be deceived as to our intentions. At the same time my brother and myself proposed a meeting of the citizens of Wood county, in order to obtain the sense of the people on what course they ought to pursue.

Mr. Hay. And was there a meeting? A. There was. Q. Did you come to any resolutions? A. we did.

Mr. McRae. What was the substance of them? A. That we were determined to support the constituted authorities of our country.

Mr. Martin. And were the resolutions published? A. They were, I think, in a paper published in Morgantown.

Mr. Hay. Do you know B's writing? A. I am not certain. Q. Did you ever see him write? A. I do not recollect. Q. Did you receive these two letters from him? A. I did.

Mr. Hay. This letter dated on the 31st August mentions his intentions to visit you.

Witness. It may not be improper to state what gave occasion to that 2d letter. Mrs. Blannerhasset insisted on taking my little boy home, 2 or 3 weeks with her family. I agreed to it reluctantly. Three or four days after they had left us, I sent my overseer for my boy, who brough the child with that second letter from Mr. Blannerhasset. This 2d letter covered an extract from a Marietta paper signed Querist, relative to the "Western World," and referred to in that letter.

Mr. Wirt. Do you know Peter Taylor? What is his character? A. I have heard no one speak of him but Mr. Blannerhasset, and he spoke of him in very high terms. Q. What is your brother's name? John G. Henderson? A. Yes. Did he not represent Wood county? A. he did some years ago.

Cross-Examined.

Mr. Blannerhasset. Have you not been a representative of Wood county? A. Yes. Q. You lived in Wood county some time before I knew you? A. I did. Q. Had you any reasons for not cultivating my acquaintance sooner? A. I had: the reasons were partly private and partly political. I have no objection to state those reasons. The political reason, that you were a democrat, and I was opposed to the present administration. Q. Do you not recollect that I opposed the election of your brother I. G. Henderson and that my vote was refused? A. I do; for I then personated my brother. Q. Do you not recollect that it was refused because I had at that time no deed for my land? A. I do. Q. Do you not recollect that I had the honor of voting for you on a subsequent occasion? A. I do. Q. Was it not after that election, that our acquaintance was formed? A. It was. Before that election, I do not recollect to have known you.

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Thursday, Sept. 24.

Mr. Alexander Henderson's cross examination.

(CONTINUED.)

Mr. Blannerhasset. Do you recollect at the time of our conversation, you expressed any personal dislike of col. Burr? Did you not express a sense of hostility towards him? A. I am sorry that the gentleman has put the question. I am sorry to wound any man's feelings wantonly. But I always thought him a dangerous man, and the late occurrences have not at all changed my opinion. Mr. *Martin.* How long has your opinion of him been formed? A. Ten or fifteen years ago, when he was making the tour of Virginia. Mr. *Martin.* Not when he was said to be fixing means to overturn the federal administration? A. I do not recollect; but I heard much at that time of col. Burr.

Mr. *Hay* here wished to identify the two letters, which Mr. Henderson had presented to the court, from Mr Blannerhassett. Mr. *Botts*, however, admitted them. They were then read by Mr. Hay, but they contain nothing important. The examination proceeded.

Mr. *Hay.* Did you, sir, read the Querist? A. I read the first No. in manuscript. It was signed Querist. Q. I think you said yesterday that Mr. Blannerhassett was the author, and was going to Marietta to publish it? Mr. *Blannerhasset* rose and objected to reading these publications on such evidence. He observed, that somebody may have written under the same signature on the very same subject: and that there was a lacuna or chasm, which was required to be filled up. Mr. *Hay.* We will fill up that chasm. Mr. Neal copied it.

(TO BE CONTINUED.)

WASHINGTON CITY.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 12.

Much has been said, from time to time, of the injury which the U. S. has sustained from the want of an adequate defence against the insults and aggressions of foreign powers. It is contended, that if we had possessed an efficient navy, and if our ports and harbors had been better protected, we should have avoided many of the indignities and aggressions offered to us, and should be now in a better situation to defend ourselves. Let us examine these points.

With regard to the better protection of ports and harbors, much unquestionably may be said in favor of, as well as against it. That they ought to be well defended does scarcely admit of a question. The only question is as to the means of defence. On this head, there has been a great and an honest diversity of opinion. Some have been for the erection of immense batteries, and the manning them with numerous garrisons: while others have been in favor of a moderate expenditure of this kind, and in favor of resting their chief reliance on the militia. The soundest policy of the U. S. probably consists in pursuing a middle course; in the erection of fortifications that would prevent an enemy from doing material injury in a short time; in the preparation, for this purpose, of extensive military apparatus; and in arrangements that would enable the government promptly and efficiently to call out the strength of the country to avert ultimate danger. It will be admitted that these objects have not, under any administration of the federal government, been sufficiently attended to. At the same time, however, it must be allowed that more has been done by the present administration than by those which preceded it; and consequently, that so far as this has been made a party question, whatever may have been the professions or boasting of the federal party, the *republican administration has done most.*

But this admission proves but little. It will not be said that any of the great sources of animosity with foreign powers, for instance with France, Spain or England, have arisen from the want of the adequate fortification of our harbors. The most serious aggressions have been committed on the ocean, and far beyond the reach of our batteries. These principally consist in the impressment of our seamen, the capture of our vessels, the extended system of blockades, and the unjust exercise of what is called the right of search. None of these could have been averted by the fortification of our harbors.

It may, however, be said, perhaps, that the defenceless state of our towns induced us to submit to these wrongs rather than expose them to bombardment and pillage. But nothing can be less true. Will the federalists say that they felt so sensibly for these vulnerable points of the union that they submitted to outrage and indignity, rather than expose them by pursuing a more spirited course? No—they disclaim the imputation. Can it, with the least color of justice be cast upon their successors? What wrongs, until those recently inflicted upon us, have required the avenging arm of justice? There have been none, say the federalists, received from England which have not been fit subjects for negociation. If this be just, it follows that there have likewise been none received from France, whose injuries, it is allowed on all hands, have not equalled those of Britain. Spain alone remains, and the injuries we have received from her have been, not on the ocean, but the land, and far removed from the neighborhood of our ports and harbors.

We have taken this notice of this branch of the subject to shew that the cry for a more energetic system of defence has merely availed itself of the point on which we have animadverted, as a pretext or cover for that which has been always uppermost in its thoughts, and that is, an increased, and as they are pleased to style it, an efficient navy.

This is in truth the source of all the *clamor* raised on this subject. There has been much dispassionate discussion with regard to other modes of defence, but the *clamor*, the loud voice of passion, has alone been sounded on this point.

Let us then meet the enquiry, how far the creation of a respectable navy would have been beneficial. We might here, without exposing ourselves to the imputation of uncharitable feelings, dwell on the inconsistency of those who support this proposition. We might shew, by indisputable proof, that those who are now the loudest in the praises of a large naval force, were the very men, who, in the year 1801, but a few weeks before Mr. Jefferson came into office, actually reduced the existing navy, small as it was. We might avail ourselves of the opinion of Mr. Stoddert, placed at the head of the navy department by Mr. Adams, who in an official report to Congress declared an annual million sufficient for this establishment, which sum has been exceeded under the present administration. But we shall content ourselves with the mere mention of these facts, and leave it to the reader to draw his inferences. Our object is not victory, but truth; and we will allow that it becomes those at the head of affairs to profit even by the inconsistencies and follies of their opponents.

This point may be viewed in two aspects;—*First*, would the establishment of a larger navy at the period when the present administration came into office have conduced during the intermediate time to the public good; *Secondly*, would it have increased our present ability to contend with an enemy?

With regard to the first point, the public good could only have been promoted by an increased navy in two ways, either by protecting our commerce and thereby increasing our wealth, or by maintaining our national character more inviolate than has been done by the opposite course.

As to the first point, we are certain of one thing, and that is, that, from whatever cause, our commerce has increased, and our national wealth with it, in a degree not only beyond that of any other nation, but likewise in a degree even beyond our own expectations. Of this we are certain; and is not this sufficient? Whether our trade and national wealth would have increased with greater rapidity, under the auspices of a different policy, is at best doubtful. There are the strongest reasons for entertaining the contrary opinion. Among these may be enumerated the following:

An increased navy would have multiplied our sources of division with foreign powers, and especially with Britain. This has been invariably the case with other nations. It would consequently have hazarded our pacific and neutral character, to which is to be ascribed the greater part of our gains.

It would have forcibly attracted the attention of rival nations to our commercial aggrandizement, and have thus probably produced the adoption of earlier means to check it.

It would have diminished the capital invested in trade by diverting a large portion of it to the purposes of a navy.

Is it not also a strong fact, an almost irresistible fact, that no nation of the old world, which has pursued an opposite career from the U. S. has advanced in wealth in the same ratio? If experiment be the test of truth, can human events supply a stronger confirmation of the wisdom of our policy? Look at the maritime condition of Europe, and what do you behold but one mighty state, whose gigantic naval power has swallowed up that of every power that attempted to rival her? And what inference can be correctly drawn from this example, but that we too, had we pursued a similar course with them, should in all likelihood have experienced the same fate?

The second point is whether our national honor would have been preserved more inviolate by the creation of a larger navy. The most obvious suggestion that here occurs is that there is strong reason to question the legitimacy of that honor that could only be maintained by the sacrifice of national wealth. It will not be denied that cases may occur in which the former can only be maintained at the sacrifice of the latter. But these are extremely rare cases; and to prove a reprehensible omission to resort to this remedy, it must be shewn that some great right was surrendered, some essential attribute of sovereignty abandoned, some humiliating wrongs endured where the capacity of resisting them existed, and that all this was suffered through the sordid dread of a loss of wealth. Can any of these charges be imputed to the U. S.? Have they surrendered any great right? Have they abandoned any essential attribute of sovereignty? This is not contended. Have they submitted to humiliating wrongs, notwithstanding they had the ability to resist them? If such wrongs have been inflicted, it is Britain who has inflicted them. And if we possessed the means of resisting them, which has always been a matter of dispute, a navy did not constitute them. For who can contend that the trifling navy of the U. S. (for trifling it must have been compared with that of Britain) would have been able to cope with hers? All that we could have done would have been to expose the Quixotism of our valor, but it would have been at the expence of our understandings. It would have been a display not of national power, but of rash spirit; and instead of leading us to triumphs, have exposed us to the most mortifying humiliations; and have thus inflicted upon our national character the deepest, if not the deadliest wounds.

(We have been obliged to defer the remainder of these remarks to make room for other articles.)

LATEST PROCEEDINGS.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 3.

Col. Burr, and his counsel thought proper again to put some questions to Gen. *Wilkinson*; for the purpose of drawing something from his answers, which might be construed as criminating him, or might invalidate his credibility.

Mr. Wickham asked him if he had made any proposals to *Timothy Kibby*, or others, *confidentially*, about the invasion of Mexico. He answered "I am unconscious of it."

After some other questions of a similar nature, to which similar answers were given, the General addressed the Court with some warmth. He observed that, upon a former occasion, reference was had to a certain letter of which so much had been said; the letter said to have been written by him to *Aaron Burr*, and designated by the post mark of the 13th of May. An attempt had been made and was now repeated, to turn to the injury of his character, some words alledged to occur in it. He therefore demanded that *Col. Burr* should produce that letter. This demand becomes necessary, said he, from the strange and unfounded accusations against me which are adduced from it; and, I only say, the humble repute I have had among my countrymen for thirty years, is not to be destroyed by the fraud, artifice and deception of my enemies. With the permission of the court I will for my own vindication, on Monday next, go into a full detail of all the transactions between Col. *Burr* and myself; which at first I avoided doing in order to save the time of the court.

The *Chief Justice.* I cannot sit to hear matters foreign to the subject. There is no sort of necessity for the explanation which *General Wilkinson* wishes to make; so far as repects the questions of a variance between his testimony to the grand jury and that pronounced before the court; for the evidence of Mr. Tazewell has proved that there is no variance. To suffer all the circumstances to be gone into would be converting the trial from that of the persons at the bar to a trial of *Gen. Wilkinson's* conduct. His vindication if he desires it, had better be given to the public in another form.

Mr. McRea wished General *Wilkinson* to be heard more fully *on some points*, respecting which his reputation had been particularly assailed, if he could not be permitted to state all that he knew.

Col. Burr. Gen. *Wilkinson* was sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If his recollection is now *animated* let him proceed.

General Wilkinson. I mentioned before that I had received certain letters from col. *Burr* which, from motives of delicacy, I did not think myself authorised to shew. Yet the letter from me bearing the post-mark of the 13th of May has been made use of against me. I demand that letter. When it is produced I shall be liberated from all reserve, and will shew his letters; which I do not wish to do; for I *really* feel that delicacy which others *profess* to feel. I here solemnly declare the assertion of *Aaron Burr*, that he had put that letter out of his power, with my knowledge, to be *utterly destitute of truth.*

Upon hearing this declaration and demand, *Col. Burr* hastily put an end to the cross examination, saying "If the General has any more evidence to give, let him give it; if not he is discharged.

(The residue of the proceedings of this day in our next.)

MONDAY, OCTOBER 5.

Our readers will recollect that Col. *Burr* declared in open court, some days ago, that he could prove General *Eaton* totally disqualified to give evidence in any court of justice. On this day the terrible threat was attempted to be carried into effect.

Col. Burr said we shall shew that *Gen. Eaton* was convicted by a court martial, in the year 1796, of an offence of the nature of *crimen falsi.* Then a question of some moment will occur; how far a conviction in a court not of common law jurisdiction can disqualify a witness. He offered evidence that the record of the trial be-